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Abstract
Insider trading is one of the numerous white collar crimes
that can contribute to the instability of the economy. Tra-
ditionally, the detection of illegal insider trades has been
a human-driven process. In this paper, we collect the in-
sider trade filings made available by the US Securities and
Exchange Commissions (SEC) through the EDGAR system,
with the aim of initiating an automated large-scale and data-
driven approach to the problem of identifying illegal insider
tradings.
The goal of the study is the identification of interesting
patterns, which can be indicators of potential anomalies. We
use the collected data to construct networks that capture
the relationship between trading behaviors of insiders. We
explore different ways of building networks from insider
trading data, and argue for a need of a structure that
is capable of capturing higher order relationships among
traders. Our results suggest the discovery of interesting
patterns.
1 Introduction
Financial markets are notoriously difficult to under-
stand, which makes the tracking of white collar crimes
such as Illegal Insider Trading very challenging. As
such, the detection of illegal insider trades has been
a characteristically human-driven process. We aim to
challenge this trend by taking a big data approach to
the problem and investigate graph-based data mining
techniques to identify patterns of illegal insider trades.
Through the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s
(SEC) Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Re-
trieval system (EDGAR), insider trade filings have been
made public, providing a substantial source of data for
research.
Insider trading is a subset of the numerous white
collar crimes that can contribute to the instability of the
economy. Financial crimes and mishandling of billions
of dollars are key issues in our society that have been
blamed for the financial crises we have seen over the last
decade. Working to detect and curb financial crimes
like illegal insider trading is a clear interest for both the
government and the people.
Insider Trading, by formal definition, is not always
illegal. Generally, insiders in a company tend to be
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either Officers (CEO, CFO), large shareholders (>10%)
or members of the Board of Directors. For these people,
a substantial percentage of their compensation comes
from stock and option awards. When they feel the need
to liquidate their holdings, they file with the SEC and
dispose of their shares. This process becomes illegal
when the insider leverages information that only he or
she may possess in order to trade stock at an unfair
profit. For example, if the CEO of a company knows the
stock will rise after announcing that they have surpassed
their quarterly goals, and decides to buy stock before
that announcement, the CEO is misusing his or her
information to gain an unfair advantage. Currently, the
SEC requires all insiders to file a Form 4 whenever they
acquire or dispose of their company’s stock. These forms
require the insider to declare how much they are trading,
what price they are trading at, and how large their
remaining holdings after the trade will be. These are
the filings that the SEC publishes through the EDGAR
system.
In this work, we leverage this data to construct
graphs that capture the relationship between trading
behaviors of insiders. The study aims at identifying in-
teresting patterns, which can be indicators of potential
anomalies. We first apply the technique introduced in
[1] to our data. We then explore additional ways of
building networks from insider trading data, and argue
for a need of a structure that is capable of capturing
higher order relationships among traders. While pre-
liminary, our results suggest the discovery of interesting
patterns. We also identify future challenges to be ad-
dressed and possible directions to tackle them.
2 Related Work
Some attempts to automate the detection of illegal in-
sider trading have been made. Goldberg et al. [2] have
found that over 85% of Insider Trading cases are corre-
lated to five different types of news: Product announce-
ments, Earnings announcements, Regulatory approval
or denials, Mergers and acquisitions or Research reports,
which they collectively refer to as PERM-R events. The
task of maintaining surveillance over trading activity is
gargantuan, with 5.5 million trades being found to be
of interest by the Insider Trading and Fraud Teams at
NASD, which is an organization that is self-run and
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keeps watch over multiple security markets, the most
notable being the Nasdaq Stock Exchange [2]. SONAR
was designed by Goldberg et al. to automate as much of
the manual process that NASD goes through every day.
Consolidating data from numerous data sources such as
Reuters, Bloomberg and the Dow Jones, it uses Natu-
ral Language Processing to analyze 8,000-10,000 articles
and correlate them with EDGAR filings as well as the
rest of the market activity. Based on all of this data,
SONAR tries to flag suspicious trades that it believes
must be more thoroughly investigated.
Another study focuses on the detection of illegal
insider trading in the options market [3]. This study
investigated the patterns created by insider trading in
the option markets. They focused on analyzing options
as they are much less frequently traded, compared to
stocks. They conducted multiple case studies and found
that whenever there was a PERM-R announcement
similar to those described in [2], option trading volume
would spike. One of their case studies described the
acquisition of Pharmacia by Pfizer. Pharmacia stock
opened 20% higher than its last closing price after
announcing the acquisition over the weekend. Till then
call volume had been steadily below 1,500 trades, but
in the days leading up to the announcement it rose
to above 8,000. Options bought for $0.55 before the
announcement could have been sold 3 days later for
$4.10, a 650% increase. While Donoho concentrates on
the option markets which is indeed ripe for analysis, in
this work we focus on the standard stock market, with
the intent of sheding some light on potential patterns
leading to illegal insider trades.
This paper was inspired by the recent work of
Tamersoy et al. [1]. The authors explored the relation-
ship between trading behavior and insiders’ roles, their
companies’ sectors, and their relationships to other in-
siders. They also performed anomaly detection over a
network they created over all insiders in their dataset.
They found that many insiders are part of cliques, where
all the trading behaviors of the members of the clique
are very similar, as well as that insiders tend to have
an abnormally high profitability of trades. Our findings
concur with these observations, but we also aim to over-
come some of the limitations of the approach in [1]. In
particular, in this work we explore additional ways of
building networks from insider trading data, and argue
for a need of a structure that is capable of capturing
higher order relationships, e.g. hyper-graphs.
A variety of methods has been introduced for graph-
based anomaly detection, although very little has been
done in the area of illegal insider trading. The approach
depends on the nature of the graph, e.g. attributed
vs. non-attributed, or static vs. dynamic. A complete
overview of such methods is beyond the scope of this
paper. A survey of the various approaches is found in
[6].
3 Data
There are numerous online resources and websites that
follow the EDGAR RSS Feed, and mine it for its
data. We chose to use Insider Monkey1, which moni-
tors EDGAR in real time and parses Form 4 filings as
they are processed by the SEC and made public. From
Insider Monkey, we scraped 1.1M insider trades, as well
as all insider positions. For example, if we consider the
case of Salesforce CEO Marc Benioff, Insider Monkey
provides us with his entire record of stock trades for
Salesforce (CRM), as well as the fact that he is Chair-
man and CEO of Salesforce, a Large Shareholder at
Fitbit (FIT) and a member of the Board of Directors
at Cisco Systems (CSCO).
The data was organized as a MySQL database and
included the names of traders, their positions, and the
companies whose stocks they traded. The historical
price of the stocks were also scraped from Google
Finance. For every ticker in Nasdaq and NYSE, we have
pricing data going all the way back to the Initial Public
Offering of the company, which spans as far back as the
1980s for older corporations. The summary statistics of
the data is shown in Table 1.
Insiders 70,408
Companies 12,485
Sale Transactions 757,194
Purchase Transactions 311,013
Table 1: Global Statistics
4 Network-based Anomaly Detection
4.1 Building Networks of Insiders As a prelim-
inary analysis we followed an approach similar to [1]
where networks are constructed based on the trading
behaviors of insiders and analyzed for anomalies among
connected components. We constructed purchase and
sale networks with insiders as nodes. Only insiders with
at least 5 trades were considered. Edges were added
based on similarity scores as defined below. Initially,
we used a similarity function that takes into account the
dates on which the insiders traded, and what proportion
of those dates were common among the two insiders, as
done in [1]. Specifically, let XC and YC be two traders
of company C, each represented as the set of dates on
which he traded. Their similarity is computed as fol-
1http://www.insidermonkey.com/insider-trading/sales/
lows:
S(XC , YC) =
(
|Xc|∑
i=1
|YC |∑
j=1
I(xi, yj))
2
|XC | × |YC |
where I() = 1 when the arguments have the same value,
and 0 otherwise. Table 2 and Figure 1 show the statis-
tics for the purchase and sale networks, corresponding
to a threshold value of 0.5 on the similarity S. The
statistics include all connected components of at least
size 2 (isolated nodes were discarded).
Network Nodes Edges Connected Components
Sale 1,508 1,943 543
Purchase 1,414 3,263 401
Table 2: Network Statistics (based on S)
Figure 1: Distribution of Connected Components
(based on S)
We observe that the similarity S above does not
account for the temporal ordering of trading dates. As
such, two traders are considered equally similar whether
they share 7 consecutive trading dates, or 7 dates
sparsely spread out in time. Intuitively, though, we may
want to consider the first case as a stronger indication
of similarity. To account for temporal ordering, we
constructed new sale and purchase networks, where a
node is represented as the sequence of his trading dates.
If two traders (nodes) shared a sub-sequence of length
at least t (threshold), we added an edge between the
two nodes. We call this construction LCS-based . The
threshold t was chosen based on the distribution of
the length of the longest common sub-sequences among
traders in the sale and purchase networks (shown in
Figure 2). As a result, we set t = 5 (corresponding
to 75.09% of insider pairs) and t = 10 (corresponding
to 71.8% of insider pairs) for the sale and purchase
networks respectively. Table 3 and Figure 3 show the
statistics for the LCS-based purchase and sale networks.
A similar trend as before is observed.
Figure 2: Distribution of Longest Common Sub-
sequences.
Network Nodes Edges Connected Components
Sale 1,885 2,178 689
Purchase 886 2,701 239
Table 3: Network Statistics (LCS-based)
Figure 3: Distribution of Connected Components (LCS-
based)
4.2 Approach The egonets in the purchase and sale
networks are analysed for anomalies [1, 4]. Let Vu be
the number of nodes and Eu the number of edges of
the egonet corresponding to the ego node u. The plot
of Vu against Eu across all egonets revealed a power
law relationship. A least squares fit on the median
values of Eu was computed and outlier scores were
assigned to each ego node. The outlier score measures
the deviation of the ego node u from the power law
relationship, and is defined as [1, 4]:
Score(u) =
max(Eu, f(Vu))
min(Eu, f(Vu))
× (log(|Eu − f(Vu)|+ 1))
where f(Vu) is the least squares fit on the median values
of Eu.
A local outlier factor measuring the density of u
with respect to the density of its neighbors (as in LOF
[5]) was added to Score(u) to obtain the Total Outlier
Score, as done in [4]:
TotalOutlierScore(u) = Score(u) + LOF(u)
4.3 Results Examples of connected components ob-
served from the networks constructed using the similar-
ity measure S are depicted in Figure 4. The figure shows
that they are highly connected components, which is an
indication of frequent pairwise similarities.
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Connected Components: (a) Purchase: Inter-
national Speedway Corporation; (b) Sale: Vantiv Inc.
The least squares power law fitting, and correspond-
ing top ten outliers are depicted in Figure 5. The
egonets of outlier ego nodes were identified and were
found to follow an interesting pattern. The anoma-
lous ego nodes often occupied a bridge position between
highly connected components, perhaps indicating the
role of hubs between cliques (or quasi-cliques) of traders.
Examples of discovered anomalous egonets are shown in
Figure 6.
The least squares fitting and egonets for the LCS-
based network construction are shown in Figure 7 and in
Figure 8. The LCS length thresholds for the purchase
and sale networks are set to 10 and 5 respectively. The
edges of the egonets in Figure 8 are labeled with the
length of the longest common sub-sequence shared by
the corresponding two nodes. The ego nodes detected
by this method still largely manifest the role of hubs
between cliques (or quasi-cliques).
5 Hyper-graph-based Anomaly Detection
5.1 Motivation While the graph-based methods dis-
cussed above lead to interesting results worth further in-
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Figure 5: Power Law Fitting and Anomaly Detection:
(a) Purchase; (b) Sale.
vestigation, they have a fundamental limitation rooted
in the use of graphs to represent traders and their inter-
actions. Graphs can only capture pairwise interactions.
As an example, consider the scenarios represented in
Figure 9. We have three traders t1, t2, and t3. In (a), t1
and t2 share the sub-sequence of dates [d2 d3 d4 d5 d6];
t1 and t3 share the sub-sequence [d9 d10 d11 d12 d13]; and
t2 and t3 share the sub-sequence [d15 d16 d17 d18 d19].
Thus each pair of traders share a different sub-sequence
of dates, resulting in a clique of size 3 (assuming t = 5).
In (b), the three traders share the same sub-sequence of
dates [d2 d3 d4 d5 d6]. This results in the same 3-clique
as in (a). Since a graph structure only captures pairwise
co-occurrences, it is not able to distinguish the two sce-
narios, with a consequent loss of important information.
In contrast, an hyper-graph can capture multi-way co-
occurrences, and therefore can discriminate between the
two scenarios. With hyper-graphs, case (a) is modeled
International Speedway Corporation
(a)
(b)
Dollar General Corporation
(c)
Level 3 Communications, Inc.
(d)
Figure 6: Egonets with Highest Outlier Scores: (a)-(b)
Purchase; (c)-(d) Sale.
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Figure 7: Power Law Fitting and Anomaly Detection
(LCS-based): (a) Purchase; (b) Sale.
with the three hyper-edges {t1, t2}, {t1, t3}, and {t2, t3},
while case (b) is modeled with the single hyper-edge
{t1, t2, t3} (as depicted in red in Figure 9). No loss of
information is incurred this time.
5.2 Building Hyper-graphs of Insiders To model
multi-way interactions among traders, we constructed
hyper-graphs from our data (purchase and sale). We
used the LCS-based approach with the same thresholds
as before. The resulting hyper-graph can be represented
as H = (V,E), where V is a set of vertices (the traders)
and E is a set of hyper-edges, where each hyper-edge
corresponds to a set of vertices.
5.3 Preliminary Results Figure 10 shows the num-
ber of hyper-edges (%) per size found in our data. Most
of the hyper-edges are regular edges (i.e., size 2), and
we observe an exponential decrease in number as the
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Figure 8: Egonets with Highest Outlier Scores (LCS-
based): (a)-(b) Purchase; (c)-(d) Sale. Edges are labeled
with the LCS length.
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Figure 9: Graphs vs Hyper-graphs: (a) Three pairwise
co-occurrences; (b) A three-way co-occurrence.
size increases, with a big gap between 2 and 3. This is
an indication that hyper-edges capture an uncommon
trading behavior which is worth exploring.
Two examples of hyper-graphs obtained from our
data are given in Figure 11. The hyper-edges are
annotated with the length of the corresponding LCS.
Insiders that belong to the intersection of multiple
hyper-edges, e.g. insider 5 in Figure 11 (a), correspond
to hubs that share significant trading sequences with
multiple cliques. We explore the characteristics of such
insiders in the following to investigate their potential of
being anomalies.
6 Evaluation
A big challenge with the detection of illegal insider trad-
ing is evaluation. How do we quantify how informative
the obtained results are? How do we verify whether the
identified traders have indeed operated illegally? Do-
main expertise and cross-checking against known past
financial events (e.g., merging or splitting of corpora-
Figure 10: Distribution of Hyper-edges.
tions) are avenues to be explored to tackle this problem.
In this work, to start evaluating our results we
looked at the profit that the identified traders made dur-
ing the sequence of dates shared with the traders identi-
fied as similar . The intent was to see whether consistent
profit was made on the transactions made during those
days. In particular, we computed the signed normalized
dollar amount as described in [1]. Briefly, we compared
the reported price of the transaction (purchase or sale)
with the market closing price of the company’s stock on
the same day of the transaction. An insider makes a
(positive) profit in two scenarios: when he buys shares
of a stock at a price lower than the closing price for that
stock, and similarly, when he sells shares of a stock at
a price higher than the closing price. The amount is
normalized by the dollar volume of the company’s stock
in question. Thus, the signed normalized dollar amount
is a value between −1 and 1. A positive value indicates
a profit; a negative value indicates a loss.
We first computed the signed normalized dollar
amounts for the top ranked insiders identified using
the LCS-based ego nets. All the hyper-edges which
included the insider node were computed, and the
union of the corresponding trading sequences were used
to compute the time series of the normalized dollar
amounts. Results are given in Figure 12. Unfortunately,
trading prices were not always available in the data.
As such, those reported are a subset of the total
actual transactions. We observe that in both cases
(purchase and sale), the majority of the transactions
are located above the 0 level, which is an indication of
repeated profit. Furthermore, Figure 12 (b) shows two
transactions that resulted in a very large profit.
As discussed in the previous section, we also plotted
the time series of the signed normalized dollar amounts
for insiders of the hyper-graphs which lie at the inter-
section of multiple hyper-edges (at least 4 in our exper-
iments). Figure 13 shows a sample result of the time
(a)
(b)
Figure 11: Examples of Hyper-graphs: (a) Purchase;
(b) Sale.
series for a group of three insiders at the intersection of
multiple hyper-edges and belonging to the same egonet
(also shown). Again, the majority of the transactions is
above the 0 level.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we have collected and analyzed insider
trading data. To capture the relationship between trad-
ing behaviors of insiders, we have constructed different
kinds of graphs.
Our results suggest the discovery of interesting pat-
terns. The anomalous ego nodes we have identified
often occupied a bridge position between highly con-
nected components, perhaps indicating the role of hubs
between cliques of traders. Our anomaly ranking can
be used by investigators to prioritize cases for further
analysis. We have also argued for the need of higher-
order structures, and therefore captured multi-way in-
teractions among insiders via the construction of hyper-
graphs. The relevance of the identified cases is sup-
ported by the analysis of the dollar amount time se-
ries signifying profit. As discussed earlier, more work is
needed to develop a thorough evaluation methodology.
We believe the complex patterns captured by hyper-
graphs of insiders deserve further exploration. We are
(a)
(b)
Figure 12: Time series of the signed normalized dollar
amounts (LCS-based Egonets) : (a) Purchase; (b) Sale.
considering a model-based generative approach to learn
the distributions underlying normal vs. anomalous
hyper-edges. Potential meta-features to be considered
are the size of the hyper-edges and the characterizing
sequences of dates (including their length). Parameters
can be estimated with a variational EM approach. A
similar method was introduced in [7] in a different
context, but the anomalous distribution is assumed to
be known and fixed, and no meta-features are taken into
consideration.
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